On Hegel's Theory of Punishment


ÜNSALAN F.

BEYTULHIKME-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, cilt.10, sa.2, ss.703-721, 2020 (ESCI) identifier

  • Yayın Türü: Makale / Tam Makale
  • Cilt numarası: 10 Sayı: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2020
  • Doi Numarası: 10.18491/beytulhikme.1574
  • Dergi Adı: BEYTULHIKME-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY
  • Derginin Tarandığı İndeksler: Emerging Sources Citation Index (ESCI), Index Islamicus, Philosopher's Index, TR DİZİN (ULAKBİM)
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.703-721
  • Kocaeli Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

It can be said that the discussions on punishment are based on politico-theological frameworks of its era. Hegel's theory of punishment gains its meaning in a similar context. Hegel draws attention with the proposal that crime and hence punishment should be redefined radically in the light of the transformations of modernity. In this study, Hegel's theory of punishment in the context of rights and recognition will be positioned historically. It will be tried to discuss how Hegel is based on a constructive concept unlike the general tendency that shows punishment as a result and a manifestation of justice. Hegel argues that revising old forms is not enough when discussing crime and punishment at a time when capitalism and a constitutional state order are slowly spreading all over the world. According to Hegel, punishment in the modern world is not an outcome in the context of the crime determined through what it should be, but rather the act that makes crime possible.