Akademik Veri Yönetim Sistemi
BEYTULHIKME-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY, cilt.15, sa.3, ss.1133-1153, 2025 (ESCI, TRDizin)
This essay explores the Aristotelian concept of equity and the discretionary power of judges within the context of modern legal philosophy. Modern jurisprudence has changed profoundly as a result of the debates between Hart and Dworkin on judicial discretion and the principles of equity. The discretion thesis asserts that judges possess both the authority to fill gaps in law and to incorporate equitable principles when interpreting the law. By contrast, Aristotle's account of equity comprises two main dimensions: first, as a moral virtue; second, as a form of legal justice. Aristotle emphasises that applying equity requires careful consideration of case-specific irregularities. This essay argues that Hart and Dworkin's discretion thesis does not fully account for Aristotle's concept of equity due to insufficient emphasis on particularity in each case. Conversely, I propose that discretionary powers within contemporary codified law systems impose a continuing legal obligation upon judges, enabling them to more effectively balance discretion with equitable considerations.