Interim bribery in auctions


KOÇ Ş. A. , Neilson W. S.

ECONOMICS LETTERS, cilt.99, ss.238-241, 2008 (SSCI İndekslerine Giren Dergi) identifier identifier

  • Cilt numarası: 99 Konu: 2
  • Basım Tarihi: 2008
  • Doi Numarası: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.032
  • Dergi Adı: ECONOMICS LETTERS
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.238-241

Özet

Bidders can bribe the auctioneer before they bid, with the auctioneer lowering the winner's bid if the winner paid the bribe. In equilibrium bidders employ a cutoff strategy and corruption affects neither efficiency nor the bidders' expected payoffs. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.