Interim bribery in auctions


KOÇ Ş. A., Neilson W. S.

ECONOMICS LETTERS, vol.99, no.2, pp.238-241, 2008 (SSCI) identifier identifier

  • Publication Type: Article / Article
  • Volume: 99 Issue: 2
  • Publication Date: 2008
  • Doi Number: 10.1016/j.econlet.2007.06.032
  • Journal Name: ECONOMICS LETTERS
  • Journal Indexes: Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Scopus
  • Page Numbers: pp.238-241
  • Kocaeli University Affiliated: Yes

Abstract

Bidders can bribe the auctioneer before they bid, with the auctioneer lowering the winner's bid if the winner paid the bribe. In equilibrium bidders employ a cutoff strategy and corruption affects neither efficiency nor the bidders' expected payoffs. (C) 2007 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.