Grev Tehdidi Olmaksızın Yapılan TopluPazarlıklarda Oyun Teorisi Analizi (Game Theoretical Analysis in Collective Bargaining Without Strike Threat)

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Çolak K., Koç Ş. A.

Political Economy of Taxation, Murat Aydın, S. SAmi Tan, Editör, IJOPEC PublicationInternational Journal of Politics & Economics, London, ss.195-207, 2016

  • Yayın Türü: Kitapta Bölüm / Mesleki Kitap
  • Basım Tarihi: 2016
  • Yayınevi: IJOPEC PublicationInternational Journal of Politics & Economics
  • Basıldığı Şehir: London
  • Sayfa Sayıları: ss.195-207
  • Editörler: Murat Aydın, S. SAmi Tan, Editör
  • Kocaeli Üniversitesi Adresli: Evet

Özet

Wages are not only determined by the market but also by collective bargainings. From the employers’ pesrpective collective bargainings are open to the risk of strikes. But, employers overcome the strike threat in collective bargaining with the help of goverment. Therefore, the absence of strike threats in collective bargaining in Turkey leads us to remediate game theoretical bargaining approach. In this study we reevaluate this scenario by using Rubinstein Bargaining Model.